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The Interwar Housing Cycle
in the Light of 2001–2012
A Comparative Historical
Perspective
Alexander J. Field

The Wnancial crisis of 2008 to 2009 and the Great Recession it precipitated
forced a rethinking among macroeconomists about the origin, prevention,
and potential mitigation of such events. One of the conclusions emerging from a considered examination of the run-up to and the fallout from
the events is the limitation of framing the policy issues solely in terms of
whether Chairman Bernanke and the Federal Reserve System, as well as
President Obama and the Congress, did the right thing when the crisis hit.
Most observers believe that the response to the immediate crisis was correct
in the sense that they believe that the appropriate remedy, once the seizing
up of credit markets began, was indeed large scale Wscal and monetary
stimulus.
As the Fed reduced short- term rates close to the zero lower bound, it
almost tripled the size of its balance sheet, and this ongoing monetary
accommodation was augmented by the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP, October 2008) and, beginning in February of 2009, the
Wscal stimulus associated with the American Recovery and Reinvestment
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Act (ARRA).1 The Republican takeover of the House of Representatives
in the November 2010 midterm elections ended prospects for additional
Wscal stimulus, at least from the expenditure side, but the Fed’s expansionary
monetary stance continued as it sustained its expanded balance sheet, purchasing, through its programs of quantitative easing, longer term securities
as some of the troubled assets acquired at the height of the crisis matured.
Analysis of the appropriate response to the crisis drew inspiration from
the experience of the country during the Great Depression. Two of the
key policymakers, Christina Romer and Ben Bernanke, were both serious
students of the Great Depression. Bernanke is famous for saying, at a 2002
conference honoring Milton Friedman on his 90th birthday, “Regarding
the Great Depression, you’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry . . . we won’t
do it again” (Bernanke 2002). Or to put it slightly more accurately, we won’t
not do it again, since Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) brief against the Fed
was not their action, but their inaction in the face of bank failures and the
consequent shrinkage in the country’s money supply.
But this approach to thinking about the lessons of either the Great Recession or the Great Depression, by focusing only on the policy response once
the crisis emerged full blown, may dissuade us from examining the process
whereby balance sheets become increasingly levered and increasingly risky
over time—in other words, the process, which may extend over several years
or even decades, whereby an economy can become increasingly Wnancially
fragile (Minsky 1964, 1975, 1986). Ignoring this aspect of the run-up to
the most recent episode makes it diYcult to understand why or how the
collapse of an asset price bubble in housing, and the consequent reduction
of spending in an overbuilt sector could have threatened such catastrophic
consequences for the United States and the world economy. To be sure, residential construction is an important component of gross private domestic
investment, but it still contributes a small portion of overall planned spending. Even allowing for a generous multiplier, it is hard to see on the face of
it how this relatively small tail could have had the potential to bring down a
much larger economic dog.
The answer, which I think is appreciated more now than before 2008,
is the signiWcance of balance sheets, and in particular the ways in which
high leverage in both the Wnancial and household sectors can generate tight
interconnections and the potential for domino eVects (systemic impacts) as
well as, in the context of house price declines, signiWcant wealth and liquidity eVects. To focus only on Fed action or inaction once the crisis hit draws
attention away from the multiple acts of legislative and regulatory commission and omission that allowed Wnancial fragility to grow in the Wrst place.
It is much clearer now that balance sheets, debt, and leverage can make a big
1. Most of the eVects of the ARRA on employment and output were experienced in 2010
and 2011. See Congressional Budget OYce (2013, 3, table 1).
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diVerence in how an economy responds to an asset price, and/or spending
shock. The Wnancial fragility of an economy can spell the diVerence between
whether the system shrugs oV a shock or potentially goes into a tailspin.
If the history of the Great Depression enriched our understanding of
and inXuenced the policy response to the Great Recession, reverse intellectual inXuences are also probable—and desirable. In particular, postmortems
on policy issues associated with the Great Recession should cause us to
reconsider the shared beliefs among many (aside from real business cycle
proponents) that the Great Depression was indeed principally caused by
the absence of adequate Federal Reserve response. The thesis that massive monetary accommodation in the early 1930s could almost entirely have
eliminated the output cost of the Great Depression needs to be reexamined.
Balance sheet considerations were likely implicated in the slow recovery
then as well as now, and might have resulted in persistent output losses,
even in the presence of a diVerent monetary policy. In the Great Recession,
the Fed drove short rates close to the zero lower bound, and also engaged,
in sustaining a balance sheet that increased almost by a factor of three, in
buying large amounts of longer term Treasury securities. It is not clear how
much more monetary accommodation could have been applied. And yet, in
its April 27, 2011, release, the Fed forecast unemployment in 2013, a full Wve
years after the worst months of the crisis, to still be in the 6.8 to 7.2 percent
range (central tendency), with some within the Fed projecting an unemployment rate of 8.4 percent (Federal Reserve Board 2011a).
The Fed’s forecast was overly optimistic. The actual unemployment rate in
June 2013 was 7.6 percent, and more than half the unemployed had been out
of work for Wfteen weeks or longer. It will likely be years before the economy
reaches a prerecession forecast of the trajectory of potential output (this is
written in 2013) and the cumulative output loss associated with the Great
Recession may ultimately exceed one and a half years of gross domestic
product (GDP) at 2007 rates.2
If massive monetary accommodation will not be able to avoid a very large
output loss over the years 2008 to 2017 and beyond we must reconsider
whether, in fact, as conventional wisdom seems to hold, massive monetary
accommodation in 1929 to 1933 would have avoided most of the output
loss associated with those worst years of the Depression. The more recent
monetary accommodation made a diVerence and without it the cumulative
output loss would likely have been larger. Similarly, more Fed accommoda2. After the start of the recession the Congressional Budget OYce revised downward its projections of potential GDP, in part because of anticipations of the deleterious eVects on labor
productivity growth of long- term unemployment. This will reduce a calculation of cumulative
output loss if we deWne the recession and slow recovery as ending at the point where actual
output again reaches potential. Such an estimate of cumulative output loss will be too small,
since the permanently reduced trajectory of potential is also a consequence of the recession
and slow recovery and the Wnancial fragility and crisis that precipitated it. See Field (2013) for
calculations.
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tion in the early 1930s would probably have meant a less severe Depression.
The question on the table, however, is whether that was all that would have
been needed to avoid a signiWcant cumulative output loss.
Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth RogoV (2009) provide historical evidence
that recessions associated with Wnancial crises require signiWcantly longer for
recovery than those that do not.3 And Wnancial crises involving institutions
that are not just illiquid but eVectively insolvent (because of a prior history
of poor and/or risky lending, augmented in some cases by fraud) pose a
much more serious policy challenge. Richard Koo’s (2009) analysis of Japan
and the International Monetary Fund’s 2012 survey emphasize that highly
leveraged balance sheets in the Wnancial, nonWnancial, and/or household
sectors can make a big diVerence both in the resilience of an economy when
faced with an asset price or spending shock, and on the eVectiveness of
monetary policy in avoiding a large output loss.4
But if balance sheet issues hindered recovery in the 1930s, we also need
to ask whether housing was implicated in the same ways and to the same
degree as has been true in the Great Recession. In 2007– 2012, bad real estate
lending clearly impaired Wnancial sector balance sheets more than did poorly
performing stock market– related loans. Was this true as well in the 1920s? In
other words, compared to more recent experience, and other categories of
lending, how much did residential mortgage lending in the 1920s contribute
to weakening bank balance sheets, making them vulnerable in the 1930s
to runs, insolvency, and failure? Secondly, at the level of household balance sheets, was bad residential mortgage debt linked in some direct way to
the anomalous drop in consumer durables spending that marked the initial
stages of the economic downturn in 1929 and 1930 (Temin 1976)? Or did
this have more to do with the loss of stock market wealth (Mishkin 1978) or
increased burden of consumer loans (Olney 1999), or an eVect running from
increased postcrash stock market volatility (Romer 1990)?
In this chapter I tread a narrow line, arguing on the one hand that we
cannot understand the onset, depth, and duration of the Great Depression
3. Reinhardt and RogoV (2010) have been criticized for aspects of that paper suggesting that
ratios of government debt to GDP above 90 percent represented a break point associated with
much lower growth rates. In This Time Is DiVerent (2009), they had cast a considerably broader
net, with as much emphasis on private as on public debt. One of the central messages of This
Time Is DiVerent was that recoveries from recessions associated with Wnancial crises tended
to be slower; neither the 2010 paper nor criticism of it undermined or conWrmed that generalization. Based on US data, Bordo and Haubrich (2011) did express doubt, although much
depended on the criteria used to deWne a Wnancial crisis. And they granted three important
exceptions consistent with the Reinhardt and RogoV claim: the Great Depression, the recession
of the early 1990s, and the recovery after the Great Recession.
4. Chapter 3 of the IMF’s 2012 World Economic Outlook oVers an overview of international
and to some extent historical evidence that housing slumps associated with prior run-ups in
household debt tend to be more severe and require more time for recovery. Koo (2009) emphasizes how high degrees of leverage contributed to years of slow economic growth in Japan,
although the emphasis in the Japanese case is on corporate and bank as opposed to household
balance sheets.
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without giving as much attention to balance sheet issues as we are now devoting in the analysis of more recent events. At the same time I will maintain
that the residential housing cycle, and lending associated with it, played a
smaller role in the interwar business cycle compared to what has been true
in the Wrst cycle of the twenty-Wrst century. To argue that housing was at the
epicenter of the downturn in 1929 to 1931, as it was in 2007 to 2009, and
as Gjerstad and Smith (see chapter 3, this volume) maintain, would require
signiWcant changes in what have become established narratives of the origin
of the downturn in the interwar period. That does not mean the claim is
wrong, but rather that it needs to be carefully considered.
There are many similarities between the Great Depression and Great
Recession, not least of which is that each was preceded by asset price
bubbles (boom and bust) in both equities and real estate. But there were
also important diVerences. The timelines are roughly inverted.5 In the 1920s
a residential real estate boom peaked in 1926, although it was followed by a
boom in apartment building and one in central business district construction
that extended into the early 1930s. The stock market boom was particularly
strong in 1928 and 1929, and the crash in equity values is often taken as
symbolic of the start of the Great Depression. Although the causal link has
been questioned—scholars have pointed to the fact that industrial production began to decline in the summer of 1929, or claimed that stock ownership was concentrated among a small portion of the population,6 or that
the market recovered considerably in the Wrst four months of 1930, or that
big declines in output and employment did not begin until months after the
crash—the October 1929 drop and subsequent downward trajectory retain
a central place in narratives of origin.7
In the Great Recession, the sequence was roughly reversed. The boom in
equities, particularly tech- based securities, began to collapse in 2000. This
was followed, however, by a major boom in the prices and construction of
residential housing, which peaked in early 2006. A commercial construction
boom followed, as had been the case in the 1920s.8
5. Another diVerence is that net inXows of foreign capital, an important factor in the early
twenty-Wrst century, were entirely absent in the 1920s, when the United States, running current
account surpluses, was a net capital exporter.
6. Romer (1990) suggests that less than 2 percent of American households held stock at the
time of the crash, citing Galbraith (1955, 78). But the empirical basis for this assertion is problematic. Galbraith cited a 1934 Senate investigation, in which 29 exchanges reported 1,548,707
customer accounts. Assuming no more than one account per household, and with approximately 30 million occupied housing units in the country in 1930, this is closer to 5 percent than
2 percent. I am indebted to Gavin Wright for drawing my attention to the open question of
how extensive stock ownership was at this time.
7. See, for example, Mishkin (1978), who emphasized wealth and liquidity eVects; Romer
(1990), who argued that post- 1929 stock market volatility adversely aVected consumer durables
purchases; or Eichengreen and Mitchener (2004, 190), who reference stock market eVects on
balance sheets throughout the economy.
8. The S&P 500 index temporarily exceeded its 2000 peak in 2007, although it remained, in
inXation adjusted terms, about 18 percent below it. In November of 2011 it was, in real terms,
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But whereas the real economy appears to have largely shrugged oV the
end of the residential real estate bubble in 1926, that does not appear to have
been the case with the stock market crash of 1929 and the slow, sickening
slide to a trough in 1932, marked as it was by some of the largest one- day
percentage increases in stock prices. And whereas the real economy largely
shrugged oV the collapse of the tech stock bubble in 2000 and 2001, that
does not appear to have been the case with the real estate collapse that began
in early 2006 and continued through the Wrst quarter of 2012. This asymmetrical real economy response to asset price deXation is associated with
almost diametrically opposed opportunities for leveraged asset acquisition
in housing and equities during the run-ups to the two crises.9
During the 1920s, mortgages commonly required 50 percent down payments, were generally nonamortized, and were for relatively short periods
(Wve years or less). In the case of federally chartered commercial banks, these
limits were legally mandated. Other lenders exercised restraint for some of
the same reasons national banks had been restricted in their ability to lend
on housing: real estate had an historical record as a very risky asset. As the
result of innovations in the 1920s by building and loans, then responsible for
more than half of institutional lending on residential housing, it did become
possible in some instances for borrowers to obtain a second mortgage and
thereby, through this mechanism, increase leverage (Snowden 2010). But not
all building and loans were enthusiastic about the practice—the larger ones
opposed it—and the overall norm remained short mortgages with modest
loan- to-value ratios.
In stocks, however, the situation was almost exactly the reverse. Particularly in the early and middle twenties, one could buy stocks for as little as 10
percent down, with the remainder borrowed. The stock purchaser typically
received margin from his broker, who in turn Wnanced this by securing a
brokers’ loan from a bank or, in the late 1920s, directly from a corporation
or private individual. If the stock price declined such that borrower’s equity
fell below an agreed upon minimum (which might be above 0), the borrower
added margin or the lender sold out the position.10
still close to 40 percent below its year 2000 high point. The NASDAQ index, which peaked
at 5,408 in March of 2000, remained in inXation- adjusted terms, almost 60 percent below its
peak. By May of 2013 the S&P 500 had risen substantially, but still stood in real terms below
its 2000 peak.
9. The asset- side wealth eVects of the dot.com and real estate busts were of similar magnitude; the decline in stock values actually somewhat larger. Between December 1999 and September 2002 approximately $10 trillion of stock market value disappeared (Gjerstad and Smith
2009). By the end of 2011, the housing crash had erased about $7 trillion dollars of house value
(the comparison between these losses does not factor in the mild inXation that characterized
the early twenty-Wrst century). Although the asset- side loss from stock market decline was
somewhat larger than that associated with the housing bust, the real economy damage from
the latter was worse, suggesting that a focus on the liability side of balance sheets is the key to
understanding why this was so.
10. White (1990) argues that credit was not “pushed” on borrowers, but rather “pulled” by
speculative fever in the stock market. His evidence is that when, under pressure from the Fed,
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In 1934, following the worst years of the Great Depression, the Securities
and Exchange Act gave the Federal Reserve authority to set margin requirements on stocks. Since 1975 these have been Wxed, for new purchases by
individuals, at 50 percent. When the tech bubble collapsed, many investors
did see their balance sheets shrink. Nevertheless, because the acquisition of
stocks had, to a lesser degree than in the 1920s, been Wnanced with borrowed
money, the collapse of the price bubble had lower potential to transmit distress to other entities (Wnancial institutions) that, indirectly or directly, held
equities on the left- hand (asset) side of their balance sheets.11 The end of the
tech boom also meant some retardation in the acquisition of information
technology (IT) equipment which, through multiplier eVects, inXuenced
consumption spending and the retardation of GDP growth. From a comparative perspective, however, the 2001 recession saw few Wnancial failures
and was of mild severity and duration. Only in the quarterly data (2001:1)
do we see a slight (one quarter) decline in real GDP (see US Department of
Commerce 2013, NIPA table 1.1.6).
member banks in 1928 and 1929 cut back on brokers’ loans, this lacuna was, in the presence of
very strong demand, quickly Wlled by private investors, corporations, and foreign banks. Rates
on brokers’ loans rose during 1928 and 1929, along with the general level of interest rates, as
the Fed allowed increases in the face of a rise in the transactions demand for cash associated
with the upsurge in stock trading (Field 1984). The Fed rationalized these rate increases, along
with member bank restrictions on brokers’ loans, as part of a program that would help control
speculation in the stock market. Rappoport and White (1994) summarize evidence that margins
rose from 10 to 25 percent in the early to mid- 1920s to 40 to 50 percent in 1928 and especially
1929. A brokers’ loan was in principle collateralized, but creditors still bore risk because of the
possibility, if prices went into free fall, that a lender might not be able to sell quickly enough
to secure his initial investment. Higher margins provided additional protection against this
risk. Rappoport and White also show that the premium on brokers’ time loans rose relative to
Treasury rates, also consistent with the likelihood that lenders had increasing concerns about
a possible crash. Nevertheless, through whatever channels, and at whatever price, credit supported the run-up in stock purchases and prices, as evidenced by the close correlation between
outstanding brokers’ loans and security prices (White 1990, Wgure 4, 75).
11. Mishkin (1978) argued that the stock market decline between 1929 and 1932 aVected
household demand through both wealth and liquidity eVects. Romer (1990) questioned the
empirical signiWcance of the wealth eVect. Typical econometric estimates are that a dollar
decline in household wealth will reduce consumption by four or Wve cents. The liquidity mechanism predicts that if Wnancial liabilities rise, or if the illiquid portion of assets rises, then demand
for new durables and house ownership may decline. The composition of the household balance
sheet, therefore, has the potential to inXuence the amount and composition of consumption.
Leveraged acquisition by households of stocks, as opposed to real estate or consumer durables,
was less likely to generate liquidity eVects because of the nature of margin loan contracts. If
prices fell, the borrower could add margin to retain the position, but in cases of rapid price
decline, the more likely outcome was that the lender simply sold out the position, removing the
stock from the asset side of the balance sheet but at the same time extinguishing the associated
liability. Banks in the aggregate did have considerable exposure. On December 31, 1929, loans
on securities comprised 39 percent of all member bank loans, more than triple the amount
of real estate loans, and loans on securities remained substantially above real estate loans
throughout the worst years of the Depression (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board 1943, Banking and Monetary Statistics, table 19, 76). But loans on securities were heavily
concentrated in the large money center banks, which in general did not fail, suggesting that for
the thousands of banks that did, bad real estate loans may have played a more important role
than is suggested by the aggregate data.
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In contrast, the collapse of the real estate bubble12 starting in 2006 set in
motion rows of falling dominoes that threatened to bring the United States
and the world economy to its knees.
These observations suggest that the pre- 2008 complacency among economists and policymakers about how real estate acquisition was Wnanced was
not justiWed. We should have been more concerned. Leverage mattered. This
is a matter of continuing and more general concern. In spite of the passage
of the Dodd-Frank bill in July of 2010, there has to date (May 2013) been
little movement to alter the incentives that even bigger and more interconnected Wnancial institutions have to make risky bets with borrowed money.13
As we try to parse the lessons from the most recent cycle, there is much to
be learned by going back and reexamining the history of housing during the
interwar period. In particular, it would be helpful to understand better why
the end of the residential real estate boom in 1926 appears to have had such
a limited adverse eVect on the real economy, as compared to what happened
in the early twenty-Wrst century (on this question, see White, chapter 4, this
volume). At the same time, we need to understand why private sector construction remained so depressed for such a long time during the 1930s. More
than two decades ago I argued that this was principally due to the physical
and legal detritus of premature subdivision in the 1920s (Field 1992), and
that in the postwar period, housing booms have created fewer obstacles to
recovery from this source, due to the development of zoning and land use
regulation. That is likely to be true as well for the most recent boom, since
land use regulation, unlike that applicable to Wnancial institutions, was less
aVected by the deregulatory enthusiasms of the 1980s and 1990s (see also
Field [2011], chapters 10 and 11).14 More than six years after it peaked in
12. By a bubble I mean an increase in asset prices unrelated to improvements in fundamentals.
It is always easier to see and say this after the fact, but even before the crash it was apparent
to a critical observer that the unprecedented increase in the ratio of house prices to median
household income in the early twenty-Wrst century could not continue indeWnitely.
13. The failure in November 2011 of Jon Corzine’s Wrm, MF-Global, was a reminder that a
newer and more eVective regulatory regime, one less subject to exploitation of loopholes and
political manipulation, remained a work in progress. Corzine had placed highly leveraged bets
(using leverage ratios of more than 30 to 1—higher than investment banks, somewhat chastened, were then risking) that troubled European sovereign debt would recover. Because of the
very slim equity cushion, it did not take much of a continued slide in the prices of these bonds to
push the Wrm into bankruptcy. Corzine also took advantage of weakening restrictions on what
trading Wrms could do with supposedly segregated customers’ accounts (see Burrough, Cohan,
and McLean 2012), and had personally intervened to help Wght back eVorts by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission to tighten these. See http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/10/31
/mf- global- bankruptcy- the- biggest- losers/.
14. The implications of the failure of construction spending to revive are signiWcant. Throughout the 1920s, gross investment in equipment, residential structures, and nonresidential structures were each of similar magnitude. In 1937, both construction categories remained substantially short of equipment investment. I calculate that had these three categories retained their
rough equality with the rates exhibited by equipment investment, and assuming a multiplier of
1.78, GDP in 1937 would have been $102.2 billion rather than the actual $91.9 billion. I estimate potential output in that year at $110.9 billion (all magnitudes in 1937 dollars). According
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2006:1, expenditures on residential construction began to recover in 2012,
although in 2013:1, a full seven years after the peak, these expenditures
proceeded at less than half peak levels in nominal and real terms.15
On the other hand, leverage, debt overhang, and foreclosure played a
major role in amplifying the impact of the housing bust in 2006 to 2012,
posing obstacles to full economic recovery (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011). An open question historically is how much the debt overhang
of the residential housing boom of the 1920s, as compared to the direct
legacy of premature subdivision, contributed to slow recovery during the
1930s. Looking at the two booms using a comparative approach can give us
some perspective on this.
What happened in the early twenty-Wrst century was quite diVerent in a
number of respects from what happened in the interwar period. The epicenter of the problems causing the initial downturn in 2007 was clearly housing,
which most argue was not the case in the Depression.16 And whereas Irving
Fisher’s debt deXation mechanism aVected mortgaged housing between
1929 and 1933, the problems in the sector in the recent episode were caused
only marginally by increasing debt burdens due to deXation. Although Bernanke and other policymakers feared more severe deXation, in part as a
result of their actions, the annual rate of change of the consumer price
index (CPI) for all urban consumers was negative only in 2009, declining
at .37 percent per year, as compared with 3.8 percent growth in 2008, and
returned to positive territory (1.6 percent per year) in 2010 (US Department
of Labor 2011). This is to be compared with the 8 percent per year deXation
that characterized 1929 to 1933.17
Bad mortgage debt contributed directly to failures of building and loans,
the provider of the majority of institutionally Wnanced mortgages during the
1920s, and this bears some relationship to the ways in which housing travails
ended up threatening system- wide damage to the economy by jeopardizing
the solvency of Wnancial institutions in the 2007 to 2011 period. But the
argument (Gjerstad and Smith, chapter 3, this volume) that balance sheet
issues associated with housing were central both to the initial downturn in
the Great Depression and to the slow recovery must overcome the long lag
of several years between when the residential housing boom ended (1926)
and the beginning of the downturn in the real economy in 1929. It must also
overcome the relatively small share of institutional lending on residential
to these calculations, more than half the output gap remaining in 1937 can be accounted for
by the failure of construction to revive. The contribution of the residential housing shortfall
considered alone is about a third. For details, see Field (2011, 271).
15. US Department of Commerce 2013, NIPA table 1.1.5, accessed May 30, 2013.
16. For a contrasting view see Gjerstad and Smith, chapter 3, this volume.
17. Home owners in the most recent episode faced increasing real debt burdens, but this was
more typically due to their use of innovative Wnancial products such as negative amortization
loans with low teaser rates that subsequently reset.
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housing contributed by commercial banks: a Wfth or less prior to 1937 (Morton 1956, table C- 2, 170).
We have abundant historical evidence that commercial bank failures can
pose a systemic threat to an economy. It is less clear that this would have been
so with building and loans. Such institutions did not issue demand deposits,
and so their failure could not reduce the money supply. Moreover, unlike
commercial banks, they did not typically borrow from or lend to other Wnancial institutions, and thus contributed little to the interconnections among
Wnancial sector balance sheets that can facilitate contagion.
On the other hand, there is little doubt that bad real estate lending contributed to the vulnerability and failure of speciWc commercial banks, particularly state- chartered banks, which faced fewer constraints on their lending
in this area than did their nationally chartered counterparts. Natacha PostelVinay (2011) has found, based on longitudinal analysis of balance sheet data
for Chicago- area state banks, that real estate lending in the 1920s inXuenced
which banks were vulnerable to failure in the early 1930s. In particular, as
did Elmus Wicker (1980), she disputes the view that bank runs were simply
liquidity events inspired by irrational fear, crises that could have been averted
by temporary intervention from the Fed. She suggests instead that most
failed banks were insolvent, and that they were so in particular because of
bad real estate lending. In other words she tells a story—admittedly one
based on the Chicago data alone—that bears analogues to 2001 to 2010, and
is in this sense supportive of what Gjerstad and Smith are trying to advance.
Indeed, it does sometimes appear that wherever and whenever one digs
into the failure of a commercial bank during the Depression, the words “bad
real estate lending” are likely to follow. This is true for the famous case of
the Bank of United States (see Lucia 1985; O’Brien 1992; Trescott 1992),
although stock market loans, in particular loans to aYliates and others to
support holding the bank’s own stock, were also implicated in its failure.18
Bad real estate loans were also prominent in the collapse of the Bain group
of banks in Chicago in June 1931, which spread to the Forman banks (Guglielmo 2011, 35). A third case in point is the failure of the Tennessee- based
banking empire of Caldwell and Company, which Wgures prominently in
the Gjerstad and Smith narrative. Wicker (1980) attributed the failure of
Caldwell and 120 other banks to poor loans and investments made in the
1920s (1980, 572).
Still, categories such as “real estate lending,” or “urban mortgages”
include loans not only on residential housing, but also on commercial and
industrial property; the focus here is mainly on the comparative contribution
of the residential housing cycle to recession/depression. Caldwell’s problems, for example, appear to have been largely in commercial real estate and
18. Temin (1976, 92) also attributed the failure of the Bank of United States to bad loans,
particularly real estate loans.
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municipal investment complementary to it rather than strictly residential
lending (Tennessee Encyclopedia 2011).
Wicker saw his interpretation as supporting Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) in what was then an ongoing debate with Temin (1976). But Wicker’s
analysis is really quite inconsistent with the narrative Friedman and
Schwartz advanced. Friedman and Schwartz downplayed the extent to
which failing banks were insolvent as a result of a prior history of risky or
poorly selected loans and investments, emphasizing instead that the banking panics were almost entirely liquidity events. This is particularly evident
in their characterization of the failure of the Bank of United States, which
they considered a solvent bank, attributing the fact that it was not rescued
in part to anti-Semitism. Friedman and Schwartz mention, although they
do not pursue further, the possibility that “the great surge in bank failures
that characterized the Wrst banking crisis after October 1930 may . . . have
resulted from poor loans and investments made in the twenties” (Temin
1976, 85; Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 355).
As does Wicker, Guglielmo (2011) links vunerability in the 1930s to poor
lending in the 1920s, attributing a weakening of Illinois state bank portfolios
to the drying up of opportunities to make short- term commercial loans—as
many corporations shifted from debt to equity Wnancing. To make up for
lost business, he suggests, banks shifted into loans backed by real estate or
stock. Although such loans may have been viewed as safe at the time they
were made, they turned out, ex post, to be quite risky. Unlike commercial
loans, neither category was discountable at the Fed. In the case of real estate,
the relatively low loan- to-value ratios of 1920s loans did not end up protecting bank collateral as eVectively as may have appeared to have been the case
when they were originated, largely due to the perhaps unexpectedly high
cost of foreclosure. Similarly, loans on stock (e.g., brokers’ loans), although
championed in the 1920s as almost as liquid as cash, turned out not always
to be so when the free fall of equity prices made it impossible to sell out fast
enough to recover collateral.
Therefore, there is considerable evidence linking bad lending in the 1920s,
including bad real estate lending, to Wnancial institution vulnerability in
the 1930s, suggesting that failures, which were already high in the 1920s
and rose much further in the 1930s, were not pure liquidity events but often
involved institutions driven to insolvency by a prior history of risky lending
(Calomiris and Mason 1997, 2003). This suggests strong parallels with the
early twenty-Wrst century, and would again seem to provide support for the
Gjerstad and Smith position. While acknowledging the importance of this
dynamic in understanding the interwar cycle, I will nevertheless continue
to make the case that the residential housing cycle in the 1920s was not the
epicenter of the Great Depression in the way it so clearly has been for the
Great Recession. To the degree that real estate lending was implicated in
bank failures in the 1920s, and it was considerable, the loans tended to be
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farm mortgages, rather than loans on residential real estate per se (Alston,
Grove, and Wheelock 1994).
It is indeed tempting to conclude that the 1920s were like the early twentyWrst century, and that the foundations for the Depression were established
in housing in the 1920s. To some degree this was no doubt true. As I have
previously argued, premature subdivision in the 1920s posed legal and infrastructural impediments to the revival of house construction in the 1930s
(Field 1992). But the Wnancial groundwork diVered in important ways. In
the earlier period a smaller fraction of houses was mortgaged, and loanto-value ratios were lower—in other words the sector was much less levered.
Bad real estate loans adversely aVected building and loan societies (forerunners of savings and loans), but their failures had little systemic impact.
In spite of the role that poor real estate (and in general poor and in some
cases fraudulent) lending played in notable bank failures in the 1930s, the
fact remains that commercial bank holdings of institutional mortgages on
one- to-four family houses never rose above 20 percent of the total until 1937
(Morton 1956, table C-2).
Because of a history of wild real estate booms and busts prior to the Civil
War, the National Banking Act (1864) tightly restricted the loans national
banks could make on land or housing. Although these prohibitions were
weakened in the face of competition from state chartered institutions, total
lending on mortgages by federally chartered commercial banks remained
very low until the second decade of the twentieth century. On June 4, 1913,
real estate loans accounted for just .7 percent of national bank assets (Behrens 1952, 16).
Loosening began with the Federal Reserve Act (1913), which for the Wrst
time allowed loans on farmland with loan- to-value not to exceed 50 percent and a period of time not to exceed Wve years, provided such loans in
the aggregate did not exceed 25 percent of bank capital and surplus or a
third of time deposits. The 1916 legislation went somewhat further, freeing
national banks to lend on nonfarm real estate for a period of time not to
exceed one year, again with a maximum 50 percent loan-to-value. The oneyear restriction was serious: prior to the McFadden Act, many commercial
bank mortgage loans were eVectively demand loans after the Wrst year. The
McFadden Act (1927) increased the allowable term on nonfarm mortgages
to Wve years with the total amount of such loans not to exceed 50 percent of
time deposits. In most cases commercial banks could not lend across state
lines, and indeed were restricted to lending on real estate within 100 miles
of the bank’s principal place of business.
State- chartered banks did not face the same restrictions in the 1920s,
perhaps one reason their failure rates were so much higher in the 1930s.
Still, even with more liberal real estate lending on the part of state banks,
total commercial bank lending as a fraction of institutional lending on oneto-four family houses did not rise above 20 percent until 1937. The rise at
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that point was partly the result of an amendment to the Federal Reserve
Act in 1935 that allowed national banks to make ten- year loans, with up to
60 percent loan- to-value, if the loan was suYciently amortized to reduce
principal by at least 40 percent within ten years. This was part of a coordinated program of mortgage liberalization advanced during the New Deal,
reXected in the establishment of the Federal Housing Authority in 1934 and
the Federal National Mortgage Association in 1938. These legislative and
policy initiatives led ultimately to the thirty- year, fully amortized Wxed rate
instrument that became common after the Second World War.
Finally, although mortgage- backed securities appeared in the 1920s,
their development was much less advanced than became the case in the
early twenty-Wrst century (White 2009, Wgure 4.14). During the 1920s they
were largely limited to pools of mortgages on apartments or other commercial properties, as opposed to Wrst mortgages on owner- occupied houses.
(Goetzmann and Newman 2010). Robert J. Gordon has noted that more
skyscrapers higher than 250 feet tall were built in New York between 1922
and 1931 than in any ten- year period before or since. Securitization and
other innovations played a signiWcant role in Wnancing this capital formation, and the balance sheet consequences, in terms of the duration of the
interwar cycle, remain to be investigated. But this dynamic is distinct from
what we normally understand as the residential housing cycle, and is not the
central focus of this chapter.
Turning now from Wnancial sector to household sector balance sheets, we
can consider other channels through which asset price deXation might have
contributed to the propagation of the Great Depression. In the presence
of a central bank with an asymmetric commitment to price stability, and
thus in the presence of deXation, even the moderate (relative to the early
twenty-Wrst century) expansion of debt in housing that took place during
the 1920s could have contributed, through the debt deXation mechanism, to
declines in demand, particularly for durables and houses themselves. Frederick Mishkin’s breakdown of the household balance sheet during the Depression shows mortgage liabilities increasing in real terms from $29.6 billion in
1929 to $33.6 billion in 1930, to $36.9 billion in 1931, and to $40.5 billion
in 1932. He shows security loans jumping in real terms from $16.4 billion in
1929 to $21.6 billion in 1930, before falling oV to $17.4 billion in 1931 and
$12.4 billion in 1932. Consumer credit liabilities (for automobiles, for example) increased from $10.1 billion in 1929 to $12 billion in 1930, to $12.3
billion in 1931, and then fell to $11.3 billion in 1932 (Mishkin 1978, 921;
all Wgures in 1958 dollars). These numbers suggest that the biggest negative shock coming from the liabilities side of the household balance sheet
between 1929 and 1930 was the increase in the real value of security loans:
$5.2 billion. The increase in the real value of real estate liabilities, $4 billion,
was about a fourth less. The stock of real estate debt, however, was larger
than securities and consumer credit debt combined, and persisted at high,
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and in the case of real estate lending rising levels (in real terms) much longer,
in part perhaps because of less adequate resolution mechanisms.
Mishkin’s data suggest that the liability- side wealth eVects on consumption emanating from stock acquisition in the 1920s were stronger than those
from real estate debt in producing the initial shocks that led to the downturn
in the economy between 1929 and 1930. However, there are unresolved issues
about the data underlying his analysis of equities. Mishkin’s table A- 1 gives
as the source for the stock market loan data column (4) of table L- 25 in
Goldsmith (1955, vol. 1, 410). That table shows that nominal commercial
bank loans for purchasing or acquiring securities fell from $8.278 billion in
1929 to $7.251 billion in 1930 (these are listed in the table as end- of-year
values).19 That is what one would have expected to have happened if, in
the presence of rapid price declines, lenders sold out the positions of their
leveraged borrowers, thus extinguishing the loans. The only circumstance in
which we might have expected nominal loans to have increased is if, in the
face of collapsing stock values, many borrowers met their margin calls and
even acquired new stock on margin in the expectation that price declines
represented a buying opportunity. This is possible, especially given that most
of the largest one- day price increases in the market during the twentieth
century took place between 1929 and 1932. But it seems much less likely than
the Wrst scenario, which would be consistent with the numbers in Goldsmith.
The problem with reconciling these numbers with Mishkin (1978) is
that there is too little deXation between 1929 and 1930 to turn these nominal decreases into real increases, let alone real increases of the magnitude
reported in his table 2. The stock market crash may have adversely aVected
spending in such areas as consumer durables because of a reduction in stock
market values or because of the inXuence of volatility on perceived uncertainty, as emphasized by Romer. It appears questionable, however, at the
household level, whether the balance sheet eVects of declining stock values
on the asset side was reinforced by a rising real value of stock market loans
on the liabilities side. Between 1929 and 1933 the wealth eVects of declines
in the values of equities were considerably more serious than were those
associated with declines in the value of real estate. On the asset side of the
household sector balance sheet, corporate stocks in 1929 were worth more
than real estate ($128.8 billion vs. $109.7 billion), a situation dramatically
reversed by 1933 ($50.9 billion vs. $81.7 billion) (data are nominal and are
from Woolf and Marley 1989, table 15.A.1, 817). Stocks fell in value more
than real estate, and much more than consumer prices, and so the assetside wealth eVect was quite large. Woolf and Marley give a 1929 value of
19. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board 1943, Banking and Monetary Statistics
(table 19, 76) shows end- of-year member bank loans on securities falling from $10.148 billion
in 1929 to $9.439 billion in 1930, although the average level of brokers’ loans was higher in
1930 than in 1929. Even a generous allowance for deXation cannot generate the increase in real
value of loans on securities reported by Mishkin.
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total equities held of $235.4 billion. That included unincorporated business
equity, trust fund equity, insurance and pension equity, as well as corporate
stock ($128.8 billion). The Dow Jones index fell 89 percent in nominal terms
and 60 percent in real terms between its peak in August of 1929 and trough
in July of 1932, although it recovered somewhat in 1933. Using the data
from Woolf and Marley, limiting ourselves to corporate stock and assuming 30 percent goods and service price deXation between 1929 and 1933, we
have stock values dropping 60 percent in nominal terms and 44 percent in
real terms over this four- year period for a loss in wealth of $57 billion in
1929 dollars. Using the Goldsmith numbers from table L- 25, we have stock
market borrowing dropping from $8.278 billion to $3.078 billion (nominal).
Again, assuming 30 percent deXation, we have stock market liabilities declining 63 percent nominal and 47 percent real, for a decline of $4.4 billion in
1929 dollars. Combining the eVects of declines of both stock market assets
and liabilities between 1929 and 1933, we have a negative net wealth eVect
of $52.6 billion ($57 billion drop on the asset side, counterbalanced by a
$4.4 billion decline on the liabilities side).
In real estate, the locus of the balance sheet eVects diVered, and overall
impact on net worth was much smaller. If we accept Shiller’s numbers (see
following) the price of houses fell, but only along with the general deXation,
so real values were largely unaVected, and therefore the asset- side wealth
eVects in the aggregate were on average small. On the liabilities side, a much
smaller fraction of the housing stock was mortgaged, and loan- to-value
ratios were much lower than was true in the early twenty-Wrst century. Woolf
and Marley (1989, table 15.A) show nominal housing values dropping from
$109.7 billion to $81.7 billion between 1929 and 1933, a decline of 25 percent. Shiller has nominal prices dropping 30 percent over those years. If we
make allowance for a modest increase in the number of structures over that
four- year period, these estimates are roughly consistent with each other.
On the other hand, the interactions of real estate debt and deXation
clearly became important in 1931 and 1932, and the negative wealth eVect
on the liability side was nonnegligible. Woolf and Marley (1989) have nominal mortgage debt falling from $16.6 billion in 1929 to $13.3 billion in 1933.
Again assuming an approximately 30 percent decline in goods and services
prices over the four- year period, this means real mortgage debt rose from
$16.9 billion in 1929 to $19 billion in 1933, a 14 percent increase, a total
of $2.1 billion in 1929 prices. Since we are assuming essentially no eVect in
inXation- adjusted terms on the asset side of the balance sheet, this is the
total deXationary impact from real estate. Even if Woolf and Marley are oV
by a factor of two or three, and the rise in real estate liabilities is closer to
what Mishkin reports, it is clear that the stock market eVects on household
balance sheets in the Wrst four years of the Depression were much larger
than those emanating from real estate—probably an order of magnitude
larger.
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To summarize, from the stock market, we have for the household sector
very large negative wealth eVects from the assets side, only modestly counteracted by the reduction in liabilities from the closing out of margined
positions. In the case of real estate, we have little if any eVect on the asset
side from change in real housing values, along with a negative wealth eVect
of an increase in mortgage liabilities through the debt deXation mechanism.
The relatively modest impact on household balance sheets from the real
estate sector over the worst years of the Great Depression, in comparison
with the impact of stock market decline, contrasts sharply with the respective impacts from these two asset classes during the 2006 to 2012 period. In
the latter period, as I will show, not only were the housing price declines,
both nominal and real, comparatively larger, but so too was the impact of
the rising nominal and real value of mortgage liabilities.
Note that, with respect to real estate, debt deXation had conXicting eVects
on lending institutions’ balance sheets. To the degree that households
managed to remain current on their nominally Wxed mortgage payments,
deXation beneWted lenders, because the real value of debt repayment went
up. Indeed, bond interest was the one category of income to capital that
increased in real terms between 1929 and 1933 (Field 2011, 269). Similarly,
declines in short rates should, ceteris paribus, have increased the value of
the higher interest longer term mortgages. But to the degree that deXation
drove borrowers to default, lenders were harmed. When real estate borrowers defaulted, of course, this may have been attributable to loss of income as
the consequence of unemployment, to rises in the real burden of payments
due to the debt deXation mechanism, or because the loan was of poor quality
in the Wrst place—and likely would not have continued to perform even in
the absence of deXation or increases in the unemployment rate.
The most recent housing cycle has been marked by a sharp decline in
both the nominal and real value of housing. In contrast, although housing
prices dropped in the early 1930s, they did so only in line with the general
deXation. Unlike the early twenty-Wrst century, however, goods and service
price deXation raised the real burden of nominally Wxed mortgage payments,
which did contribute to foreclosure.
The wave of foreclosures in the early twenty-Wrst century, on the other
hand, required neither deXation nor falling income to precipitate it. Falling
(indeed, no longer rising) nominal house prices combined with high loan-tovalue and “innovative” Wnancing instruments such as negative amortization
loans with teaser initial rates were enough to get many home owners into
very serious trouble. Because average loan- to-value ratios were so much
lower as were nominal price declines, the phenomenon of underwater homes
(loan balances greater than house values), still endemic today (2013), was
less common during the Depression (but see also Guglielmo 2011, 13, who
asserts the contrary, although without evidence). In the nation as a whole
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more than one in four home owners with a mortgage remained underwater
in the Wrst quarter of 2013.20
It was much more the case, particularly after 1929, that people got into
trouble not because housing prices had fallen per se, but because income had
fallen as the result of other causes, combined with the eVects of deXation
in raising the burden of mortgage payments Wxed in nominal terms. In a
number of respects, therefore, the precipitators of foreclosure diVered in
the two cycles.
2.1

Shiller’s Series

As part of the research for his book Irrational Exuberance (2006), Robert
Shiller assembled a series on real and nominal house prices going back to
1890. His source for nominal house prices for 1890 to 1933 is Grebler, Blank,
and Winnick (1956), whose data were based on a survey of home owners in
twenty- two cities who were asked to report the value of their house in 1934
and what they originally paid for it and when. Since the index created from
these reports tracks prices for the same housing units at diVerent times, it
is not subject to the compositional bias that can bedevil comparisons of
median house prices over time (see Shiller 2006, 234).
Shiller’s data for 1934 to 1941 are based on advertised home prices in
newspapers in Wve cities: Chicago, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York,
and Washington, DC. His students collected about thirty house prices for
each city for each year, except that the Washington data are based on a
median price series from Fisher (1951). Data for those years may therefore
be partially aVected by the upward bias characteristic of median sales price
data, which can in part reXect improvements in house quality. Given the
relatively low level of house construction during the 1930s, however, the bias
is probably small. Shiller uses the Consumer Price Index to deXate nominal
house values both pre- and post- 1934 to get a series on real house prices,
which appear in his book as part of Wgure 2.1.
For most readers of the second edition of Irrational Exuberance (the Wrst
dealt only with the stock market boom), the principal takeaway from the
longtime series on real housing prices was the strikingly dramatic run-up in
real estate prices between 2000 and 2006. In percentage terms the increase
in the real price of a house (approximately 60 percent between 2000:1 and
2006:1) was larger during this period than during any comparable period
going back to 1890. The increase in house prices following the Second World
War (measuring from 1944 to 1953) came close in percentage terms, but it
took place over a larger number of years and, in contrast with the run-up
20. http://www.zillow.com/visuals/negative- equity/#12/43.8065/- 71.5023, accessed May 30,
2013.

56

Alexander J. Field

over the 2000 to 2006 period, the new higher level of real house prices was
sustained for half a century.
As Shiller updated his numbers, they revealed a staggering fall in the value
of an asset that conventional wisdom held should and could never decline
nationally. According to his quarterly data, nominal prices through 2012:1
declined 34 percent from their peak in 2006:2. The economy also experienced
mild inXation over this period. Data on real housing values indicate that they
declined 42 percent over the period 2006:1 through 2012:1; the index drops
from 198.1 to 113.9. Widespread reports of price appreciation in 2013, particularly in certain markets, such as the San Francisco Bay Area, did reXect
a real phenomenon, but the positive news was much ampliWed by the real
estate industry. Shiller’s real price index for houses had risen to 121.7 by the
fourth quarter of 2012, a 7 percent increase from the trough, but a long way
from 198.1.
In a 2005 interview with New York Times correspondent David Leonhardt,
Shiller predicted house prices could fall 40 percent in inXation- adjusted
terms (Leonhardt 2005). Because of the mechanics of simple percent calculations, the 60 percent increase followed by 42 percent decrease in real
housing prices left the index in 2011:4 below where it had been in 1998:4,
thirteen years earlier. By 2012:4 it had recovered to where it was in 1999.
The price recovery to date (May 2013) has been, on a national level, quite
modest. With one out of four home owners with a mortgage still underwater
(see footnote 20) the magnitude and severity of this housing cycle should
not be downplayed.
Investors are taught that they must be prepared to take substantial losses
if they are to enjoy the upside potential of assets such as stocks. But it is not
what individuals expected from housing, certainly in the postwar period.
The expectation that houses would hold and possibly increase their value
helped justify and reinforce institutional changes that allowed lower down
payments (higher leverage) in house purchases starting in the 1930s. New
norms and mechanisms of housing Wnance originating in the 1930s established an institutional regime that helped real house prices remain basically
stable for Wfty years, from the early 1950s through 2001. Boomlets marked
the last part of the 1970s and, associated with the Savings and Loan Crisis,
1988 through 1990. But in both cases the price rises, modest compared to
what were experienced in the early twenty-Wrst century, quickly subsided.
Looking at Shiller’s entire series since 1890, it is clear that the degree
of real house price decline between 2006 and 2012 in the United States
does have historical precedent. But if we study the series closely we discover
something else that is quite remarkable: no such decline took place during
the interwar years. It is true, according to Shiller’s index data, that a house
purchaser buying at the peak in 1907 and selling in the trough of 1921
would have experienced a 40 percent decline in real value, similar to that
experienced since 2006. And a house purchaser buying at the peak in 1894
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and selling at the trough in 1921 would have lost 47 percent of the value
of the house in real terms.21 These house price losses, however, would have
been experienced over twenty- seven- and Wfteen- year holding periods, not
a Wve- year period. Moreover, these calculated losses are partly an artifact of
the sharp post–World War I inXation, which home owners probably—and
correctly—did not expect to last.
In contrast with evidence of large declines in the real price of housing
in 2006 to 2012, what is striking for a student of the interwar period is the
relative tameness of price movements during the 1920s and 1930s. There
was indeed a real estate boom during the 1920s, one whose details have been
seared into the consciousness of economic historians by the lurid descriptions of it contained in J. K. Galbraith’s The Great Crash (1955). In terms of
overall construction activity, there were, as noted, actually three consecutive
booms, a boom in single- family residences that peaked in 1926, an apartment building boom that peaked a year later, and a central business district
building boom that extended into the early 1930s (because of semicompleted
projects such as the Empire State Building). And, looking at residential
prices, there was appreciation and depreciation prior to and following the
construction peak. But the magnitudes of these price swings, compared with
2001 to 2012, are mild.
Let’s look Wrst at nominal prices (Wgure 2.1).22 We can see house prices
increasing from 1919 through a peak in 1925, then declining to about the
1919 level in 1930 and then continuing to fall along with the general deXation
in the economy before beginning to increase again in 1934.
The relative tameness of house price movements in the interwar period
is even more apparent when we look at real price movements (Wgure 2.2).
Comparing Wgure 2.2 with Wgure 2.1, one can see that the main eVect of
moving to a real index is to moderate the decline evident in the early 1930s.
As for the 1920s, after 1922, the nominal and real indexes move very closely
with each other, because the CPI was basically stable between 1922 and 1929.
Examining the real house price series one cannot help but be struck by the
almost complete absence of a 2001 to 2012–style price bubble and collapse.
There is actually a slight upward trend in real housing prices, comparing the
1930s with the 1920s, which might or might not be due to the change in the
data source post- 1934. Of course, even if the decline in real house prices
between 1925 and 1932 was only 12.6 percent (as compared with a real
decline of 42 percent between 2006 and the end of 2012), the nominal decline
21. Both 1893 and 1907 are peaks associated with Wnancial panics that ended NBER business
cycle expansions. Indeed, the ending of the 1907 crisis beneWted from the intervention of J. P.
Morgan (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 160), and set in motion forces that would lead to the
creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913.
22. This series is described in Fishback and Kollmann’s Wgure 6.1 (chap. 6) as “Shiller GBW
hybrid.” They normalize on 1930 whereas, following Shiller, I normalize on the year 2000. The
other diVerence is that my y axis begins at the origin, which produces a less exaggerated impression of the degree of house price Xuctuations during the interwar years.
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Fig. 2.1

Nominal house price index, United States, 1919– 1941

Source: Shiller (2012), housing data, available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
Note: 2,000 = 100.0.
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Fig. 2.2

Real house price index, United States, 1919– 1941

Source: Shiller (2012), housing data, available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
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in the context of mortgages with Wxed nominal interest payments had the
potential to contribute to debt deXation and persisting problems with debt
overhang and contagion in the 1930s. As noted in the earlier discussion of
Mishkin, however, the lower fraction of houses mortgaged and lower loanto-value ratios meant that the adverse eVect on household balance sheets
of deXation in the face of Wxed nominal mortgage payments was modest.
As already mentioned, I argue that the diYculties construction had in
recovering in the 1930s had more to do with the legacy of premature subdivision (see Field 1992) than with debt overhang from real estate. This view
is strengthened by looking at the interwar housing cycle in the light of 2001
to 2012. Assuming house prices bottomed out in 2012:4, the 2006 to 2012
peak- to-trough decline in real housing prices of 42 percent was more than
triple the 1925 to 1932 decline in percentage points. And, as I will show,
housing was much more highly leveraged in the more recent episode, which
enabled it to pose more of a systemic threat.
2.2

Critiques of Shiller’s Series

A number of scholars, including contributors to this volume, have raised
doubts about the reliability of Shiller’s series for the 1920s and the years 1934
to 1940. Eugene White (2009, see also chapter 4, this volume) has argued that
the data disguise the true magnitude of the house price boom and bust in the
interwar period. White Wnds the series too volatile in the early years, which he
attributes to the declining sample sizes as one goes back further in time, but
he also suggests that the level of the series in the 1920s, and thus its interwar
volatility, is biased downward because the series does not include the prices of
houses bought at the peak and subsequently abandoned or foreclosed upon.
Such houses, he argues, would not have shown up in Grebler, Blank, and
Winnick’s 1934 survey. He notes, however, that the size of the possible bias is
“diYcult to assess in the absence of suYcient additional national or regional
data” (White 2009, 9; 2014, x). Price Fishback and Trevor Kollmann (chapter
6, this volume) note that GBW also produced a house price series adjusted
for depreciation, and, reinforcing White’s view, suggest that Shiller’s use of
the unadjusted series biases downward the price increases during the 1920s.
In their 2011 paper in the Review of Financial Studies, Fishback et al.
reported data derived from the US census on the ratio of the value of owneroccupied housing in 1930 to the value of mortgaged owner- occupied housing in 1920 for 272 large cities in the United States (Fishback et al. 2011,
1784).23 They found that the average ratio was 1.45, meaning that nominal
23. Fishback and Kollmann expand on this work, proceeding to develop an index of house
prices of owner- occupied mortgaged homes. What we aspire to, however, is an index of qualityadjusted house prices, irrespective of whether they are owner occupied, and irrespective of
whether they are mortgaged. Their calculated average owner occupied mortgaged (AVOOM)
index is not necessarily a representative index of the price of the entire universe of prices, only
those that are owner occupied and mortgaged.
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prices in 1930 were 45 percent higher than they had been in 1920. In contrast,
the Grebler, Blank, and Winnick (GBW) data show nominal house prices
lower in 1930 by about 7 percent than in 1920. The Fishback and Kollmann chapter in this volume (chapter 6) supersedes the comparisons made
in the 2011 paper, although the data presented still suggest that the GBW
data understate nominal price rises between 1920 and 1930, and overstate
increases between 1934 and 1940.
Fishback et al. (2011) compared census data for all owner- occupied
houses in 1930 with mortgaged occupied houses in 1920. It is diYcult to
know if this diVerence in the sample space between the 1920 and the 1930
census data they rely upon introduces a bias, and if so in which direction.
Fishback and Kollmann’s contribution to this volume achieves consistency
in comparing 1920 and 1930 by concentrating on data on mortgaged owneroccupied units, at the expense of focusing on a somewhat narrower subset of
the residential housing stock (the GBW data are for single- family, owneroccupied units, irrespective of mortgage status).
An issue of particular concern in making comparisons of median house
prices is one upon which Shiller placed a great deal of emphasis. It has to
do with changes in the composition of the housing stock and the necessity
of comparing the prices of similar housing units through time. Houses are
a heterogeneous asset category. If over time the average unit becomes larger
or in other respects better (or the reverse), then comparisons of changes
in median house prices may not accurately reXect what is happening with
respect to quality- adjusted prices. Careful attempts to correct for changes
in the composition and characteristics of housing inform the construction
of the widely referenced indexes which in part bear his name. As the methodology section for the currently produced S&P/Case-Shiller indexes states,
The indices measure changes in housing market prices given a constant
level of quality. Changes in the types and sizes of houses or changes in
the physical characteristics of houses are speciWcally excluded from the
calculations to avoid incorrectly aVecting the index value.
That is one reason Shiller found the data underlying the GBW series
appealing: the survey asked people what their house was currently worth and
what they paid for it and when. The index was constructed based on comparisons of value over time for the same housing units. The modern CaseShiller indexes are based on repeat sales of similar houses. In other words,
they rely on comparisons over time of prices of individual houses that have
sold at least twice. The index is constructed by sampling recent real estate
transactions and then searching prior transaction records to create matched
sales pairs for individual houses. As the document describing the methodology states, “The main variable used for index calculation is the price change
between two arms- length sales of the same single- family home” (Standard
and Poor’s 2009, 6). All repeat sales pairs are candidates for inclusion, but
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non- arms- length transactions, such as those between family members, are
excluded, as are transactions in which the property type is changed; for
example, when a property is converted to a condominium. Statistical techniques are used to reduce the weighting of outlier transactions that are not
likely to truly be matched pairs because, for example, maintenance has been
neglected or the house has been extensively remodeled, and to reduce the
weight of transactions that are far separated in time.
The statistical underpinnings of the Shiller-GBW series for the years 1934
and earlier are, to be sure, sparser and noisier than those that underlie the
modern Case-Shiller series. The raw materials were estimated values and
remembered sales prices observed during 1934 rather than actual transactions data covering a number of years. GBW acknowledge the likelihood of
purchase year “heaping” on years ending in 0 or 5. For each city, the price
relatives to 1934 were calculated as the ratio of aggregated recalled purchase
price to estimates of aggregated estimated 1934 values (the indexes might
more closely have approximated the repeat sales methodology had they,
for each year, averaged the price relatives for each individual housing unit).
Despite its limitations, however, the GBW index is closer conceptually to the
repeat sales (matched pairs) methodology than are some of the comparisons
reported by Fishback et al. (2011) or Fishback and Kollmann (chapter 6,
this volume).
GBW also produced a second “adjusted” series, which assumed that housing service Xow and “real” value depreciated at a compound rate of 1 and 3/8
percent per year. Fishback and Kollmann note that GBW believed this series
superior, and wonder why Shiller did not use it. GBW argued that houses
deteriorated in value over time because of wear and tear and obsolescence.
They acknowledged that structural additions and alterations worked in the
opposite direction but cited evidence supporting their view that the former
eVect dominated (1956, appendixes C and E). There remains, however, a
theoretical and empirical question as to whether the service Xow from a wellmaintained house truly declines through time. A well- maintained house, like
a chair, may have a depreciation proWle more akin to the proverbial onehorse shay.24 Shiller may have been receptive to this view, and thus preferred
the unadjusted series.
24. The reference is to a poem by Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. The shay was so well constructed
that it lasted 100 years before falling apart. The Case-Shiller methodology emphasizes the
importance of controlling for changes over time in the size and physical characteristics of the
average housing unit. The age of a unit might be considered a physical characteristic, but, again,
the service Xow from a well- maintained house, like a shay, may not necessarily decrease with
age. The size and physical characteristics (electriWcation, for example) of the over seven million
units constructed in the 1920s, in relation to what was in place in 1920, and the units that were
withdrawn from service during that decade, are in my view issues of greater empirical signiWcance than whether one uses the “adjusted” series constructed by GBW that factors in depreciation on the housing stock. None of the alternate series investigated by Fishback and Kollmann
(chapter 6, this volume) changes the conclusion that house price movements, both nominal
and real, were more moderate during the interwar period than has been true in 2001 to 2012.
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Returning to the comparisons Fishback et al. make between the 1930 and
1920 census data, there are several reasons these might depart substantially
from what would be yielded by matched pair reports of the same houses sold
in 1920 and 1930. The most important is that the housing stock was diVerent
in 1930. Over the years 1920– 1929 inclusive, over 7 million new private,
permanent, nonfarm housing units were built (Grebler, Blank, and Winnick 1956, table B-1, 332). The 1930 census reported 23.2 million occupied
nonfarm housing units. Since few of the units built in the 1920s would have
been abandoned, unoccupied, or torn down in 1930, we can conclude that
at least 30 percent of the units in 1930 simply were not there in 1920. Moreover, although few of the newly built units would have vanished, been torn
down, or been unoccupied in 1930, some of the units whose prices had been
reported in the 1920 census of mortgaged units were, by 1930, abandoned,
torn down, or unoccupied, and they were likely to have been smaller units
with less desirable physical characteristics.25 The 1920 census reported about
17.6 million occupied housing units, and the 1930 census 23.2 million, an
increase of 5.6 million. Since there were roughly 7 million units constructed,
we can infer that about 1.4 million units fall into the category of present in
1920 but absent in 1930.
Because the 1930 enumeration included 7 million generally higher quality
houses not present in 1920, and because it did not include approximately
1.4 million generally lower quality units that had been in the enumeration
in 1920, the 1920 to 1930 comparisons reported by Fishback et al. and Fishback and Kollmann may give a misleading picture of quality- adjusted house
price change between 1920 and 1930.
Fishback and Kollmann emphasize the outlier nature of the unadjusted
GBW series, although other data are consistent with the picture it paints.
Fisher (1951, 55, table 7), for example, looked at a sample of 3 percent of
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) mortgage loans in the states
of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The underlying data included
appraisal values for those reWnancing loans in 1933 and 1934 and purchase
prices in 1925 and 1927. These are for the same houses, and thus the data
approximate the repeat sales data that underlie the current Case-Shiller
indexes, although the HOLC appraisals may have overstated the market
value of the homes in 1933 and 1934 because of a rule limiting the loanto-value ratio of the mortgage they could oVer to 80 percent. Median prices
in Fisher’s sample decline 31 percent between 1925 and 1933 to 1934. Grebler,
Blank, and Winnick report approximately the same percentage decline in
their twenty- two city sample over these years. In the Fisher sample, homes
purchased in 1926 and 1927 had a decline of 26.9 percent nominal to 1933 to
25. For example they may have been less likely to have had hot and cold running water, had
an interior bathroom, or been wired for electricity.
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1934. Using the Grebler, Blank, and Winnick series for a similar calculation
yields a 25.2 percent decline.
Another regional series is the National Housing Agency’s compilation of
monthly price data for Washington, DC, from 1918 through 1948, which was
based on asking prices for houses listed for sale in newspapers. The annual
average for 1930 is 13.5 percent higher than for 1920 (see Carter et al. 2006,
series Dc 828), compared with Fishback et al.’s 45 percent increase and
Grebler, Blank, and Winnick’s 7 percent decline. The Fisher numbers can be
reconciled with the Grebler, Blank, and Winnick series, given the fact that
the housing stock in 1930 was possibly of better quality and that these are
not and do not approximate matched sales.
Fishback et al. (2011) also compare housing prices reported in the 1940
census with those reported in the 1930 census, and Wnd them in nominal
terms to be 48.6 percent lower; Shiller has them about 5 percent lower.26
The issue of changes in the composition of the stock is less important in the
1930s than the 1920s, since many fewer units were constructed than had been
true in the 1920s. The number of occupied nonfarm housing units increased
just 19 percent during the 1930s (4.4 million), as opposed to the 30 percent
jump during the 1920s. The number of housing starts in the years 1930
through 1939 inclusive was even less, totaling only 2.586 million (Grebler,
Blank, and Winnick 1956, table B-1). This means, since the number of occupied units rose 4.4 million, that approximately 1.8 million units abandoned
or unoccupied at the time of the 1930 census were now again in use. We can
infer that these were lower quality units (after all, they had been abandoned
during the boom time of the 1920s) and their reintroduction into the occupied housing stock may be one of the reasons the Fishback et al. data show
a sharper drop in reported values between 1934 and 1940.
All of this discussion speaks to the signiWcance of the matched sale methodology pioneered and championed by Case and Shiller in developing meaningful price indexes for a heterogeneous housing stock whose composition
changes over time. Fishback et al. and Fishback and Kollmann have done
yeoman work in digging up new data. But the alternatives they explore may
not necessarily do a better job than the GBW series preferred by Shiller
of reXecting changes in quality- adjusted house prices for the 1920 to 1934
period.27
26. Fishback and Kollmann (chapter 6, this volume) suggest somewhat smaller price declines
after 1934, but still substantially larger than the Shiller numbers. As Shiller acknowledges, the
Wve- city survey his students conducted for years after 1934 makes no claim to approximate a
repeat sales methodology.
27. Fishback and Kollmann also augment the GBW series by adding data for thirty- one cities
to the twenty- two originally used by GBW. But the expanded coverage does not change the
picture much. Compare “GBW adjusted” in their Wgure 6.1 with “New GBW-Style Adjusted”
in their Wgure 6.4. In both cases these series include the adjustment for depreciation, which
Shiller eschewed.
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Both nominal and real prices matter in thinking about the impact of
housing price Xuctuations on the real economy. In an institutional environment characterized by Wxed nominal debt obligations, nominal prices matter, because their decline can decrease the value of an owner’s equity. When
both house prices and goods and service prices are declining (as was true
between 1929 and 1933), the real burden of debt repayment can go up if
mortgage payments are Wxed in nominal terms. But not all home owners had
a mortgage. Indeed, the majority did not. For those who did, loan- to-value
ratios were smaller than they are today. If we are interested in possible wealth
eVects of consumption caused by declines in housing equity, real prices
matter. If you own your house free and clear, or have a small mortgage on
it, and it drops in value 30 percent, but so does the CPI, it should not have
a great eVect on your behavior.
All of the decline in real house prices in the interwar period had already
taken place by 1929, with no apparent ill eVects on the economy. Real housing prices were actually higher in 1933 than they had been in 1929. In order
for the magnitude of the decline in real house prices in the interwar period
to approach what has taken place since 2006, either the 1929 Wgure suggested
by Shiller and Grebler, Blank, and Winnick would have to be 40 percent too
low or the 1933 Wgure 40 percent too high, or there would have to be some
combination of too low earlier and too high later yielding biases in the nominal data suYcient to disguise a 40 percent drop in the real price. We should
accept that the real price decline in the most recent cycle has been substantially greater in magnitude—the collapse has been more severe—than what
took place during the interwar years.
2.3

Construction

There are of course at least two dimensions to a housing boom—price and
quantity—and so one might expect from the more modest price movements
between 1919 and 1941 that the boom and collapse of construction was also
more moderate in the interwar period than it was in the early twenty-Wrst
century. And one would be quite mistaken (see Wgures 2.3 and 2.4). From a
construction standpoint the interwar boom was in fact the greatest in terms
of the Xuctuations of construction activity, both in absolute terms and as
a proportion of GDP, that the US economy has ever experienced. In 1924,
1925, 1926, and 1927, residential housing construction comprised more than
5 percent of GDP (over 6 percent in 1925), a Wgure not exceeded until the
most recent boom.28 In the 2001 to 2005 boom, the share of residential
28. See Carter et al. (2006) series Dc256 for construction and Ca213 (Balke-Gordon) for
the gross national product (GNP), which yields a residential construction share of 5.8 percent
for 1924, 6.0 percent for 1925, 5.7 percent for 1926, and 5.3 percent for 1927. Kendrick’s GNP
estimates (series Ca188) are very similar. Both Balke-Gordon and Kendrick are intended conceptually to be comparable to the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates published from
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construction rose from 4.6 percent in 2000 to 6.2 percent in 2005 (the year
that housing prices peaked nationally) before falling to 3.4 percent in 2008
and 2.5 percent in 2009. By 2011:1 it had declined further to 2.2 percent, in
2013:1 it had recovered only to 2.7 percent (US Department of Commerce
2013, NIPA table 1.1.5, accessed May 31, 2013).
In comparison, by 1929 the housing construction share of GDP had fallen
to 3.9 percent and by 1933 to 1 percent of a greatly reduced GDP (US
Department of Commerce 2013, NIPA table 1.15). So in terms of GDP
shares, housing construction went from 6 percent to 1 percent of GDP
between 1925 and 1933, and from 6.2 percent to 2.2 percent from 2005 to
2011. If we looked at residential construction as a fraction of potential
rather than actual GDP, the contrasts between these two episodes would
be even greater.
The drop is especially dramatic in the interwar period, as Wgure 2.3 indicates, if we look at the absolute decline in inXation- adjusted residential
construction. The years 1926 to 1933 witnessed an 89 percent decline in
real construction activity. In comparison, assuming that the housing construction cycle bottomed out in 2011, we see a peak- to-trough decline of
57 percent in real construction activity between 2006 and 2011(see Wgure
2.4).29 From the standpoint of construction activity, the 1920s boom and
bust was proportionately larger. Yet the price movements associated with
that housing cycle were more modest.
The absence of big real house price movements in the interwar period
means that the mechanisms whereby housing contributed to recession/
depression were diVerent in the two cycles. In the 1930s, the collapse of
construction spending and its weak recovery contributed to a slow revival
in private sector aggregate demand primarily through standard multiplier
mechanisms. Since the collapse of the building boom was associated with
modest movements in the real price of housing, and the impact of the debt
deXation mechanism was softened by the smaller fraction of houses mortgaged and lower loan- to-value ratios, the impact of the housing bust on
household balance sheets was also more modest. In comparison with the
wealth and liquidity eVects on consumption of collapsing stock prices, the
inXuence of the end of the housing boom on consumption expenditures
through this mechanism was weaker, at least initially.
Between 2006 and 2011, in contrast, the collapse of the housing boom
was associated with an approximately $7 trillion hit to household balance
sheets (in comparison, the Xow of US GDP in 2011 was about $15 trillion
per year). This decline in home equity was the result of a pincer movement: nominal mortgage debt continued to increase through 2007 and then
1929 onward. Using Kuznets’s variant 1 for the denominator (series Ca184) puts residential
construction’s share at 6.2 percent for 1924, 6.4 percent for 1925, 6.1 percent for 1926, and
5.7 percent for 1927.
29.US Department of Commerce 2013, NIPA table 1.1.3, accessed May 30, 2013.
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Residential construction, United States, 1919– 1941

Source: Carter et al. (2006, series Dc262).
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Index of real residential construction, United States, 2000– 2012

Source: http://www.bea.gov, NIPA table 1.1.3, accessed May 30, 2013.

declined only modestly, while nominal house prices fell sharply (see Wgure
2.6). The consequence was a big reduction in household real estate wealth.
Given the uneven distribution of mortgage debt this pushed millions of
home owners underwater, in the sense that they owed more than their homes
were worth. The 2006 to 2008 American Community Survey showed that of
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approximately 75.4 million owner- occupied US housing units, 51.4 million
had a mortgage (US Bureau of the Census 2011, series B25087). Of these,
more than one in four remained underwater in the Wrst quarter of 2013.
Even though there were tens, indeed hundreds of thousands of foreclosures
during the Depression, the phenomenon during the most recent episode has
been more widespread and more severe in its consequences, particularly if
we try and restrict our attention to residential housing, as opposed to the
farm foreclosure problem. During the Depression the problem was not typically that people owed more on the house than it was worth.30 The problem
was simply that they could not make the mortgage payments, in part because
their nominal income had fallen, and in part because the drop in goods and
service prices had increased the real burden of their mortgage payments.
Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) estimate that a 10 percent decline in
household wealth has somewhere between a .4 and a 1.1 percent eVect on
consumption (although see Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles 2009 for a
more skeptical view of the size of this coeYcient). Whatever the number we
agree on, we are dealing here with a drop in owner’s equity of more than 50
percent, from $13.1 trillion in 2005 to $6.3 trillion in 2010. Nothing comparable happened with respect to real estate wealth in the interwar period. In
contrast, the contractionary eVect of lower construction expenditures was
relatively more signiWcant during the interwar housing boom.
Why were the price movements and wealth eVects so much more muted
during the interwar period than in 2001 to 2012? The most compelling
answer is simply that residential housing was less leveraged in the 1920s than
it became in the early twenty-Wrst century. Mortgage “innovations” such as
option adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), no documentation loans, and
no money down loans magniWed the upward price movements during the
boom, as they did the downward movements in the bust. These institutional
innovations helped upend an institutional equilibrium that, by and large,
had kept real house prices relatively stable for half a century.
Another way to look at this question is to ask why housing leverage was
so low in the 1920s when, as evidenced by the stock market, the Wnancial
system was clearly capable of Wnancing highly leveraged asset acquisition.
Why was it that mortgage lenders in the 1920s were so stingy with down
payment and maturity terms? Again, common terms were 50 percent down,
Wve- year mortgages with a balloon payment at the end. It is true that innovations pioneered by small building and loan societies enabled some borrowers
to take a second mortgage and thus borrow a larger share of the house value
(Snowden 2010). But these innovations were opposed by larger building and
loan societies, and overall, especially in comparison with the early twenty30. Since loan- to-value ratios rarely exceeded 50 percent in the 1920s, and the average nominal price decline between 1929 and 1933 appears to have been about 30 percent, simple arithmetic tells us that the phenomenon of underwater houses, or negative equity, with the outstanding
loan value exceeding the house value, must have been infrequent in comparison to what has
been the case in the post- 2005 period.
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Wrst century, the overall picture is one of conservatism (White [2009], 26
reaches a similar conclusion).
One might argue, and indeed it was argued in the 1930s that the typical
loan contract from the 1920s was in fact risky to lenders (Morton 1956). It
was the heavy and perhaps unanticipated costs of foreclosure that made it
so (see Ghent 2010, 11). Given the experience with the foreclosure process
that had by then manifested itself, one can perhaps understand the argument
from an ex post standpoint. But if foreclosure had been costless, requiring a
50 percent down payment surely would have given considerable protection
to the lender, who always, of course, had the option of rolling the balloon
loan over. It is hard to see how, absent the large transactions costs associated
with foreclosure, an 80 percent, thirty- year loan, even one fully amortized,
was, on the face of it, less risky for the lender than a 50 percent, Wve- year,
nonamortized loan.
There was in fact a large percentage increase in mortgage lending in the
Wrst half of the 1920s. But that increase was from a modest base, and considering loan- to-value ratios and other metrics, it is fair to say that lending on
residential real estate, in comparison to what transpired in the early twentyWrst century, remained conservative.31
This conservatism was in part because legislation governing lending by
national banks mandated higher down payments. And even though statechartered commercial banks and building and loans were not so constrained,
the prior history of land and real estate speculation, in which lending standards had been at times lax, leading to sometimes extreme cycles of boom
and bust in house prices prior to the 1920s, which lay behind the National
Banking Act restrictions, acted as something of a deterrent on lending by
institutions that were not constrained.
White (2009) has argued that conservatism in the 1920s was reinforced by
the absence of a “too big to fail” expectation,32 although it is not clear that
the major players in the residential mortgage market (building and loans,
mutual savings banks, insurance companies) could have had this expectation
even had the government or Fed announced a willingness to rescue systemically important institutions. For a Wnancial institution to be systemically
important it must have liabilities serving as assets for other institutions,
so that if it fails its creditor Wnancial institutions are threatened as well, or
like a commercial bank, have demand deposits as liabilities, so that collapse
reduces the means of payment (money supply).
31. Whether the same can be said for loans on commercial and central business district
structures remains an open question. See Postel-Vinay (2011) for evidence on the role bad real
estate loans played in failures of Chicago- area state banks.
32. White also emphasizes the typical absence of deposit insurance (state schemes generally
covered smaller banks in more rural or agricultural areas) as well as the imposition in some
states of double liability on shareholders of failed banks, both of which, it can be argued,
increased the incentives of depositors or shareholders to monitor the liability side of Wnancial
institutions of which they were creditors.
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To be sure, by the last years of the 1920s, there was plenty of excess in
real estate lending. Declines in lending standards (see Saulnier 1956), selfdealing, fraud, all of this was evident in absolute terms. But not in comparison
with what took place between 2001 and 2008. Decades of experience of real
estate cycles in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had persuaded
lenders—and legislators—that real estate was a very risky asset, by no
means certain or even expected to appreciate, and one for which lenders
should take moderate and short- lived stakes, and ensure that borrowers had
plenty of skin in the game.
An implication of this is that although the failure of housing construction to revive during the 1930s helps explain the duration of the Depression,
balance sheet aspects of housing sector Wnance are today more important
in obstructing recovery than was true in the Great Depression. As has been
noted, there are several distinct mechanisms whereby housing can aVect a
downturn. A decline in construction can, ampliWed by multiplier eVects,
lead directly to a decline in equilibrium output, associated with drops in
both consumption and gross private domestic investment. In the 1920s the
decline in residential construction was, from an aggregate demand perspective, compensated for by the apartment building boom followed by central
business district (CBD) construction, which extended into the 1930s. Strong
exports helped as well. But when construction went south big time in the
1930s, this mechanism became very important in accounting for the prolonged downturn and the failure to recover.
A second depression- inducing, housing- related mechanism involves borrowers on real estate who cannot service their mortgages, become delinquent,
and eventually face foreclosure. As they struggle to meet their mortgage
obligations, nonhousing consumption is adversely impacted. Foreclosures
were an important feature of the early 1930s (see Wheelock 2008), but they
were not primarily produced by the cessation of increases and then actual
declines in house prices, which was the main driver after 2006. Rather, during
the early years of the 1930s, it was declines in income (among those unemployed, for example), that predisposed to foreclosure. Of course as deXation
set in during the early 1930s, the real value of debt service obligations Wxed in
nominal terms did increase, aggravating the pressure on borrowers in diYcult
positions. Because of lower leverage, however, shorter average durations of
mortgages, and a smaller fraction of the housing stock encumbered by loans,
bad mortgage debt from housing did not play as signiWcant a role in transmitting a Wnancial shock to lending institutions as was the case in 2007 to 2009.
2.4

Foreclosures

There was indeed a serious foreclosure problem during the Great Depression, but it was more speciWcally a farm foreclosure problem. Two decades
of farm prosperity came to an end at the conclusion of World War I, and

70

Alexander J. Field

farm incomes and land values declined steadily during the 1920s, a major
factor in bank failures during that decade (Alston, Grove, and Wheelock
1994; Field 1992, 2001). The precipitous decline in agricultural commodity
prices between 1929 and 1933 made a fragile situation worse, and attempts
to foreclose led to actual or threatened violence and multiple state- level
foreclosure moratoria.
Foreclosures on residential housing during the 1930s, although a very real
and painful phenomenon, were, however, proportionately less common than
has been true in the years since 2006. To show this, we begin with interwar
data for nonfarm housing units, over three- fourths of the occupied housing units in 1930, for which the statistical information is less ambiguous.
The number of foreclosures for nonfarm occupied housing units, 68,100 in
1926, rose to 134,900 by 1929, and peaked in 1933 at 252,400, before gradually subsiding to 58,559 by 1941 (Carter et al. 2006, series Dc1255). The
1930 census reported 23,235,982 occupied nonfarm housing units (Carter
et al. 2006, series Dc697-698). Using the 1930 occupied housing number
as a denominator, and the peak 1933 foreclosure number as numerator, we
can conclude that 1.08 percent of the nonfarm occupied housing stock was
foreclosed upon in the worst year of the Depression. This number is probably biased slightly upward because we have not attempted to correct for the
possible growth in occupied housing units between 1930 and 1933.
In contrast, RealtyTrac (2011) reported that in 2010, 2,871,891 housing
units in the United States experienced a foreclosure Wling.33 This represented
2.23 percent of all US housing units; the total of about 130 million in 2010
includes seasonal units as well as occupied all year units and those that were
vacant. Note that the 1933 calculation has occupied units in the denominator. If that calculation were comparable to that made for 2010, the denominator would include vacant and seasonal units as well, and the foreclosure
rate would be lower.
The fact that more than twice the proportion of all housing units were
foreclosed upon in 2010 as compared with the proportion of nonfarm units
foreclosed upon in 1933 is indicative of the higher fraction of the housing
stock encumbered by a mortgage, the substantially higher degree of leverage,
and the much greater decline in nominal and real housing prices that have
marked the more recent cycle.
The data for the 1930s in the aforementioned calculations are, of course,
for the nonfarm housing sector. Adding in data on farm- occupied housing
units will increase our estimate of the rate for all occupied units. The 1930
census shows that there were about a third as many occupied farm housing
units (6,668,881) as there were nonfarm units (there were 29,904,663 total
units, so farm housing units were about a quarter of the total). The rate
33. The data on Wlings include notices of default, scheduled auctions, and real estate owned
(REO) property.
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of foreclosure on farm housing would have had to have been substantially
higher than on nonfarm housing to yield a foreclosure rate on the entire
occupied housing stock approaching that experienced in 2010. I calculate
that 424,473 farm housing foreclosures—6.2 percent—or one of every sixteen farm housing units would have had to have been foreclosed upon in
1933 in order to make the overall foreclosure rate on residential housing
equal to what it was in 2010.
The rate of foreclosure on farm housing is inextricably entangled with the
rate of foreclosures on farms, and these are not exactly the same. They are,
nevertheless, closely related, and we do have some data on the latter. Alston
(1983, 886) reports that in 1933, the worst year of the Depression, over
200,000 farms were foreclosed—3.88 percent of all farm units. This is signiWcantly below the 6.2 percent rate that would have been needed to equate
the overall 1933 foreclosure rate to that experienced in 2010. Since a number
of states passed laws instituting moratoria on farm foreclosures, it is possible that in their absence, we would have had foreclosure rates at that level.
Citing Federal Reserve Board data, Alston, Grove, and Wheelock (1994,
415) indicate that 42 percent of owner- occupied farms had a mortgage
in 1930. Parker (2005, 57), reviewing early research by Galbraith, reports
that half of all farm mortgages were in default by 1933. This suggests that
approximately a Wfth of owner- occupied farms were potentially vulnerable
to foreclosure during the worst year of the Depression. In comparing foreclosure rates on residential housing in the early twenty-Wrst century with
those in the 1930s, a diYculty thus arises: how should we treat a foreclosure
or potential foreclosure on a farm property that also includes a residential
housing unit? Since roughly a quarter of all residential housing units were
on farms the issue can be neither dismissed nor easily resolved.
Some conclusions can, however, be stated without qualiWcation. If we
restrict our attention to nonfarm residential housing units, or to actual
foreclosures on all residential units (considering a foreclosure on a farm as
equivalent to a foreclosure on a farm housing unit) the foreclosure rates in
2010 were unambiguously higher than those during the worst year of the
Depression. These higher foreclosure rates were, moreover, generated in an
environment in which the unemployment rate did not break 10 percent (as
opposed to 25 percent in 1933), which gives us additional appreciation for
how fragile the housing Wnance situation had become by 2006.
In the 1930s, and under the aegis of the Federal Housing Authority, institutional changes ushered in an era of higher leverage in housing than had
prevailed in the 1920s. These changes were associated with a one- time permanent upward movement in real housing prices in the years immediately
after the war. In part because of organizational and procedural controls
on the quality of lending, however, this rise was sustained, leading to a
half century of relative stability in real housing prices, from the early 1950s
through 2001. Prior to the twenty-Wrst century, this was disrupted at the
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Sources: Nominal value of net housing stock, US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011, Wxed asset table 1.1, http://www.bea.gov, accessed June 6, 2011); nominal value of mortgage debt on residential structures, Carter et al. (2006, sum of series
Dc916-922).

national level only by boomlets in the late 1970s and again during the savings and loan (S&L)–fueled 1988 to 1990 period, but each of these subsided
relatively quickly.
Beginning in the 1980s under President Reagan, gathering steam under
President Clinton in the 1990s, and continuing under President George W.
Bush at the turn of the twenty-Wrst century, Wnancial deregulation and
changes in the Wnancial services industry destroyed the previous institutional
equilibrium. Out of this witches’ brew (much more than simply the low
interest rates of the early twenty-Wrst century, on which it is often blamed),
emerged the housing boom and the near catastrophic Wnancial meltdown
that followed.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the very diVerent degrees of housing leverage
in the interwar cycle as compared with 2001 to 2012. Figure 2.5 shows the
nominal value of the net housing stock along with the nominal value of
residential mortgage debt from 1926 through 1941. The debt- to-asset ratio
never rose above 25 percent during these years (see Wgure 2.7), starting at
10.9 percent in 1925, ending at 12.5 percent in 1941, and peaking in 1932
at 22.6 percent under the inXuence of temporarily declining nominal house
prices, and a relatively stable nominal debt burden. It is certainly true that
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Fig. 2.6 Nominal value of housing stock and mortgage debt, United States,
1995–2012
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011, Wxed asset table
1.1, http://www.bea.gov); Carter et al. (2006, series Dc916-922); http://www.federalreserve
.gov, Flow of Funds accounts, table B-100, lines 4 and 33, accessed May 30, 2012.

in 1932 home owners were stressed. But the degree of leverage is dwarfed
by what transpired in the Wrst decade of the twenty-Wrst century. The debtto-asset ratio averaged roughly 40 percent during the run up to the housing
price explosion, and then jumped to over 60 percent starting in 2006 in the
face of rapidly declining house prices and a nominal debt burden that continued to increase through 2007 and then fell oV only slightly. It remained
at that level through 2011.
The comparative trends in housing debt- to-asset ratios, comparing 1925
to 1941 with 1996 to 2012, are illustrated in Wgure 2.7.
2.5

Conclusion

Using a comparative historical approach, this chapter has identiWed
several important diVerences in the housing sector’s characteristics and contributions to macroeconomic instability in the interwar period as compared
with 2001 to 2012. First, in terms of Xuctuations in residential construction
activity, and whether measured in absolute terms or as a share of GDP, the
interwar housing cycle was more severe than 2001 to 2012. But it was less
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severe in terms of Xuctuations in the real price of housing and their impact
on household and banking institution balance sheets. Finally, housing was
much less levered in the 1920s than was true in the run up to the most recent
crisis.
The chapter argues that the second and third of these diVerences are
related. During the 1920s, a prior historical experience of housing booms
and busts had disciplined lenders to treat housing as a very risky asset, and
made them at least initially unwilling to lend liberally on it, with the standard
for “liberalism” being what transpired between 2001 and 2008. Although
these inhibitions, which had been reinforced by legislation and government
regulation, weakened as the decade of the 1920s proceeded, the overall outcome was still a housing sector that was much less leveraged than in 2001 to
2012. In contrast, between 2001 and 2006 institutional restraints on lending
that had for the most part obtained for half a century broke down under the
banner of deregulation, innovative ways to Wnance housing, and shoddy and
sometimes fraudulent work by mortgage appraisers, originators, securitizers, and ratings agencies.
The channels through which a housing bust aVected the rest of the
economy were diVerent across these two periods. The impact of the collapse in construction spending in the 1930s was felt particularly strongly
through its eVect on real gross private domestic investment, and, through
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multiplier mechanisms, indirectly on consumption. In the housing bust of
the early twenty-Wrst century, this mechanism was weaker. On the other
hand, the relative stability of housing values in the interwar period meant
that the eVect of the end of the boom on household consumption through
a direct wealth eVect was weaker, certainly in comparison to the eVect of
the collapse of stock prices.
In contrast, in 2001 to 2012, with an almost $7 trillion drop in house
values, this eVect was stronger. And because of the much higher degree of
leverage in 2001 to 2012, the problems of debt overhang and underwater
home owners were more severe than was true in the interwar period. Moreover, because of the interconnections between high leverage in households
and highly leveraged and interconnected Wnancial institutions, the ability
of a prior real estate lending boom to pose a systemic threat to United
States and world Wnancial institutions was higher in the Wrst decade of the
twenty-Wrst century than was true in the interwar period. The mechanisms
and interconnections that allowed this to happen in the early twenty-Wrst
century are documented in the Wnal report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (2011).
Compared to what happened in the 1920s, postwar subdivisions were
more eYciently designed for an automobile age, and, because of the integration of the subdivider/developer function there was much less of a postboom
problem of subdivisions with a few houses built here and there. Subdivisions
in the postwar period tended to be opened in sections, with a new one not
opening until the previous one had been built out. This was not true in the
1920s. As bad as things may have been after the savings and loan bubble or
the most recent upswing, they were worse in this respect during the interwar
period. That is, the physical legacy of premature and partially completed
subdivisions in the 1920s posed a greater hindrance to the recovery of construction in the 1930s than has been true in postwar cycles. True, some overbuilt subdivisions from 2001 to 2010 left vacant and allowed to deteriorate,
may ultimately have to be bulldozed; this was true as well after the S&L
insolvencies. But the physical legacies of postwar housing booms, including
the most recent one, pose less of an obstacle to long- term recovery than was
true during the interwar period.
On the other hand, the Wnancial legacies pose a more serious threat to
economy- wide recovery today than was true during the Depression. That
is because housing was much less leveraged in the 1920s than was true in
the early twenty-Wrst century. In the more recent episode, more houses had
mortgages, loan- to-value ratios were much higher on average, and securitization has meant that there were many more avenues for contagion from
household to Wnancial institution balance sheets.
When New Deal reformers set their minds to mitigating the likelihood of
a recurrence of the Great Depression, they addressed housing, but placed
much more emphasis on the travails of the stock market. They insisted on
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separating commercial and investment banking.34 During the 1920s housing boom, commercial banking had been involved to only a limited degree
in housing Wnance, and although investment banking activities did include
placements of some mortgage- backed securities, these tended to be for
the purposes of Wnancing commercial and other nonresidential structures
(Goetzmann and Newman 2010). The insistence on separating commercial
from investment banking (Glass-Steagall) was motivated by what were perceived as improper or imprudent commercial bank lending on stocks, not
real estate. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 mandated new transparency in security issues and corporate reporting in the hopes of mitigating the magnitude and impacts of subsequent
booms and busts in the market for equities.
New Deal legislation, including acts establishing the Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation (1933), the Federal Housing Administration (1934), and the
Federal National Mortgage Association (1938) did address issues in the
housing sector. While these organizations aimed at alleviating Depression
era problems, their mandates do not suggest that housing and its Wnancing
per se was perceived as a locus of the origins of the economic downturn.
The HOLC engaged in remedial intervention, and indeed stopped making
new loans after 1935. The FHA pioneered in establishing the viability of the
thirty- year, Wxed- term, fully amortized mortgage, and promulgating better
designs for residential subdivisions, and the Federal National Mortgage
Association, chartered in 1938, established a secondary market for home
mortgages. These changes helped usher in a half century of relative stability
in real house prices.
But these changes in the institutional mechanisms of residential Wnance
were not primarily oriented toward mitigating a systemic risk that lending
on real estate was perceived as having generated during the 1920s. Remedial
eVorts to mitigate such risk concentrated much more on the stock market,
focusing on the purchase, sale, and Wnancing of equities, with the twin objectives of increasing transparency and limiting leverage. Unlike real estate,
which declined in nominal terms by 30 percent but in real terms hardly at
all, the 89 percent nominal (60 percent real) decline in the Dow Jones index
reXected a drop in the value of the highly levered stock market that had more
severe consequences.35 Indeed, while the Securities and Exchange Act of
34. Investment banking proWts, among other sources, derive from commissions earned marketing new bond and stock issues to retail customers, advice provided to potential merger
candidates, and income from trading on the bank’s own account (proprietary trading). There
is abundant evidence that proprietary trading by depository institutions was implicated in the
2008 Wnancial crisis, and some evidence that its frequency, and the share of proWts from this
source, increased prior to the crisis (see “Obama to Propose Limits on Risks Taken by Banks,”
by Jackie Calmes and Louis Uchitelle, New York Times, January 20, 2010; Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission 2011). The “Volker rule” was intended to prohibit proprietary trading
by commercial banks.
35. As Eichengreen and Mitchener observed, “the Great Crash bequeathed a legacy of
problems for banks, corporations and households, which had assumed heavy debt loads and
packed their portfolios full of now poorly performing assets” (2004, 190).
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1934 was tightening margin requirements on stock purchases, amendments
to the Federal Reserve Act in 1935 loosened margin requirements in terms of
the ability of federally chartered national banks to lend on real estate. And
while those amendments relaxed constraints on lending by banks on real
estate, perhaps the most famous legislation of the New Deal era, the GlassSteagall Act (1933– 1999), drastically restricted the ability of commercial
banks or their aYliates to take positions in equities. This emphasis on the
market for stocks rather than real estate as ground zero for the unfolding
Great Depression stands in sharp contrast to the diagnoses of the locus of
the onset of the 2008 and 2009 Wnancial crisis and ensuing economic recession and slow recovery. The diVerential legislative attention during the New
Deal is consistent with the narrative developed in this chapter.
There is broad consensus that the 2007 to 2012 Wnancial crisis and aftermath originated in US housing markets, precipitated by imprudent real
estate loans, enabled by lax regulation and associated behavior by ratings
agencies, and facilitated by innovations in mortgage products and derivatives, particularly credit default swaps and tranched mortgage- backed securities. There is as well much evidence that, for both the interwar period and
the early twenty-Wrst century, the quantity and quality of credit extended
during the boom created obstacles to recovery that prolonged depression/
recession.
But history never repeats itself exactly. Although no doubt contributory,
bad residential housing lending in the interwar period did not play as central
a role in blocking recovery as it does today. The legacies of the explosion of
mortgage debt between 2001 and 2007 and the 42 percent drop in real house
prices between 2006 and 2012 included impaired household balance sheets,
eVectively insolvent Wnancial institutions, and extensive, lengthy, and drawn
out foreclosure processes. These legacies exercised a persistent retardative
eVect on the macroeconomy, the result of which will be a cumulative output
loss substantially exceeding that associated with the 1982 recession, which
had heretofore been the worst since the Great Depression.
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